Policy-Making Powers of the Japanese Prime Minister after the 2001 Reforms: Another “Presidentialization” Case?

Abstract

Japan’s central government reforms in 2001 introduced a new approach to policy decision making, by implementing institutional measures that gave the Prime Minister a genuine center of power. These measures included legal clarification of the Prime Minister’s power to make proposals at Cabinet meetings, reinforced the Cabinet Secretariat’s planning function, and created the Cabinet Office (in particular, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy). This paper examines the context behind this drastic transformation, and how these changes were implemented. It also documents the consequences of this power shift, by providing numerical evidence of increases in the Prime Minister’s staff complement, the augmentation of administrative bodies that report to him, and the extent of the legislative power now under his direct authority. Based on these analyses, this paper concludes that this strengthening of the Prime Minister’s power represents a Japanese version of the well-known “presidentialization” framework described by Poguntke and Webb.